August24, 2025:  By the end of 2023, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was largely destroyed by Ukrainian airborne and naval drones, as well as land-based anti-ship missiles. About a third of the Russian ships survived and took refuge 488 kilometers away in the Sea of Azov. There, the Black Sea Fleet remains while repairs are carried out on damaged ships and crews undergo training. This did not resolve the issue, as a larger problem emerged: sailors were being sent to Ukraine as infantry. This practice extended beyond the Black Sea Fleet, with Russian generals also mobilizing sailors from the Baltic, Northern, and Pacific fleets. The army even conscripted shipyard workers. Compounding these issues is persistent corruption. Even during wartime, corruption persists among shipyard workers, managers, and equipment suppliers. Russian government and military officials often view the war not as a national emergency but as an opportunity to enrich themselves by misappropriating funds intended for the war effort.

This situation is not new. The poor performance of Russian troops in Ukraine stems significantly from endemic corruption within the Russian military. These wasteful practices, longstanding in Russian military tradition, contribute to its historical underperformance. Young men from wealthy families can pay approximately $500 to avoid military service or deployment to Ukraine. Those in combat zones can pay over $10,000 for a certificate of combat injuries, accompanied by a medical discharge from the military. For those remaining in service, bribes secure extended leave to visit family and friends (costing nearly $1,000), promotions, certificates of physical fitness, or even a military driver’s license for those unqualified to drive. Bribes also help soldiers avoid punishment for using cellphones in combat zones.

Most Russian soldiers lack the financial resources to bribe their way out of trouble or danger. Consequently, poorer soldiers face higher risks of death, while those with wealthy families often survive and return home with purchased certificates of honorable combat service.

Bribes are also used to suppress uncomfortable discussions. A decade ago, efforts to modernize the military included initiatives to reduce corruption. However, these efforts failed because too many individuals in the military and the ineffective defense industries profited from bribes, and many paid to have their offenses overlooked.

Corruption and poor management have created significant problems. Many officers are either incapable of or uninterested in implementing suggestions to improve combat capability. Senior officers often prioritize personal wealth over building modern, post-Cold War armed forces. Defense industry officials have consistently demonstrated incompetence, resulting in poorly developed or shoddily constructed weapons. Troops have voiced complaints about these issues for years, yet reform efforts have achieved little. Critics advocate for greater realism in addressing military corruption and the deficiencies of Russian defense industries.

Since the 1990s, a military modernization effort has been underway as the government recognized the need to address rapidly aging equipment. In many cases, new purchases were essential because, with few exceptions like ballistic missiles, acquisitions of new equipment and weapons ceased during the 1990s. As a result, most armed forces continued using Cold War-era weapons and equipment from the 1970s and 1980s. Fortunately, older equipment from the 1950s and 1960s was scrapped as the armed forces shrank by 80 percent in the 1990s. Since Russian defense industries were never world-class, the military was often left with updated Cold War equipment that could not compete with the new generations of weapons and accessories adopted by Western forces.

By the end of the 1990s, it was believed that at least a third of Cold War-era equipment would be replaced. In categories requiring new technology, over 80 percent of older equipment needed replacement. The government promised the military significant modernization, but when these plans failed to materialize, morale suffered. This was particularly evident in the navy, where officers and sailors were told funds would be available to maintain more ships for increased sea time. However, existing ships could not handle heavy use due to corruption-crippled repair efforts, necessitating either new ships or costly refurbishments of existing warships. After the 1990s, the air force resumed long-range patrols over areas off the Russian coast, which had seen little activity since the 1980s. From 1991 until recently, Russian warships spent most of their time docked, leaving an entire generation of naval personnel with limited operational experience.

The new equipment received has been underwhelming. Troops, with access to the internet, can compare Russian equipment to contemporary Western ships and systems, and the Russian equivalents rarely measure up. However, this is an improvement over aging Cold War-era equipment that rarely functions.

The Russian armed forces have accepted that they will never return to the Soviet Union’s glory days, which ended with its dissolution in 1991. During the Cold War, the Red Army and the Red Fleet were formidable, with over five million troops and military spending consuming 10–20 percent of a roughly $2 trillion GDP. Exact figures are uncertain, as the Soviet system lacked accurate financial reporting. Currently, Russia adheres to Western European standards, allocating 3–4 percent of its $2.1 trillion GDP to the military. While this growing economy provides more funds, most are spent replacing outdated Cold War-era weapons, which were already considered obsolete and of limited use in the 1990s.